Tree Projections and Structural Decomposition Methods: Minimality and Game-Theoretic Characterization

Tree projections provide a mathematical framework that encompasses all the various (purely) structural decomposition methods that have been proposed in the literature to single out classes of nearly-acyclic (hyper)graphs, such as the tree decomposition method, which is the most powerful decomposition method on graphs, and the (generalized) hypertree decomposition method, which is its natural counterpart on arbitrary hypergraphs. The paper analyzes this framework, by focusing in particular on "minimal" tree projections, that is, on tree projections without useless redundancies. First, it is shown that minimal tree projections enjoy a number of properties that are usually required for normal form decompositions in various structural decomposition methods. In particular, they enjoy the same kind of connection properties as (minimal) tree decompositions of graphs, with the result being tight in the light of the negative answer that is provided to the open question about whether they enjoy a slightly stronger notion of connection property, defined to speed-up the computation of hypertree decompositions. Second, it is shown that tree projections admit a natural game-theoretic characterization in terms of the Captain and Robber game. In this game, as for the Robber and Cops game characterizing tree decompositions, the existence of winning strategies implies the existence of monotone ones. As a special case, the Captain and Robber game can be used to characterize the generalized hypertree decomposition method, where such a game-theoretic characterization was missing and asked for. Besides their theoretical interest, these results have immediate algorithmic applications both for the general setting and for structural decomposition methods that can be recast in terms of tree projections

Tractable Optimization Problems through Hypergraph-Based Structural Restrictions

Several variants of the Constraint Satisfaction Problem have been proposed and investigated in the literature for modelling those scenarios where solutions are associated with some given costs. Within these frameworks computing an optimal solution is an NP-hard problem in general; yet, when restricted over classes of instances whose constraint interactions can be modelled via (nearly-)acyclic graphs, this problem is known to be solvable in polynomial time. In this paper, larger classes of tractable instances are singled out, by discussing solution approaches based on exploiting hypergraph acyclicity and, more generally, structural decomposition methods, such as (hyper)tree decompositions

Tree Projections and Constraint Optimization Problems: Fixed-Parameter Tractability and Parallel Algorithms

Tree projections provide a unifying framework to deal with most structural decomposition methods of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). Within this framework, a CSP instance is decomposed into a number of sub-problems, called views, whose solutions are either already available or can be computed efficiently. The goal is to arrange portions of these views in a tree-like structure, called tree projection, which determines an efficiently solvable CSP instance equivalent to the original one. Deciding whether a tree projection exists is NP-hard. Solution methods have therefore been proposed in the literature that do not require a tree projection to be given, and that either correctly decide whether the given CSP instance is satisfiable, or return that a tree projection actually does not exist. These approaches had not been generalized so far on CSP extensions for optimization problems, where the goal is to compute a solution of maximum value/minimum cost. The paper fills the gap, by exhibiting a fixed-parameter polynomial-time algorithm that either disproves the existence of tree projections or computes an optimal solution, with the parameter being the size of the expression of the objective function to be optimized over all possible solutions (and not the size of the whole constraint formula, used in related works). Tractability results are also established for the problem of returning the best K solutions. Finally, parallel algorithms for such optimization problems are proposed and analyzed. Given that the classes of acyclic hypergraphs, hypergraphs of bounded treewidth, and hypergraphs of bounded generalized hypertree width are all covered as special cases of the tree projection framework, the results in this paper directly apply to these classes. These classes are extensively considered in the CSP setting, as well as in conjunctive database query evaluation and optimization

Computing the shapley value in allocation problems: Approximations and bounds, with an application to the Italian VQR research assessment program

In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximized, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money compensation to perform a fair allocation taking into account the actual contribution of all agents to the social welfare. Coalitional games provide a formal mathematical framework to model such problems, in particular the Shapley value is a solution concept widely used for assigning worths to agents in a fair way. Unfortunately, computing this value is a #P-hard problem, so that applying this good theoretical notion is often quite difficult in real-world problems. In this paper, we first review the application of the Shapley value to an allocation problem that models the evaluation of the Italian research structures with a procedure known as VQR. For large universities, the problem involves thousands of agents and goods (here, researchers and their research products). We then describe some useful properties that allow us to greatly simplify many such large instances. Moreover, we propose new algorithms for computing lower bounds and upper bounds of the Shapley value, which in some cases provide the exact result and that can be combined with approximation algorithms. The proposed techniques have been tested on large real-world instances of the VQR research evaluation problem

Computing the Shapley value in allocation problems: approximations and bounds, with an application to the Italian VQR research assessment program

In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximised, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money compensation to perform a fair allocation taking into account the actual contribution of all agents to the social welfare. Coalitional games provide a formal mathematical framework to model such problems, in particular the Shapley value is a solution concept widely used for assigning worths to agents in a fair way. Unfortunately, computing this value is a #P-hard problem, so that applying this good theoretical notion is often quite difficult in real-world problems. We describe useful properties that allow us to greatly simplify the instances of allocation problems, without affecting the Shapley value of any player. Moreover, we propose algorithms for computing lower bounds and upper bounds of the Shapley value, which in some cases provide the exact result and that can be combined with approximation algorithms. The proposed techniques have been implemented and tested on a real-world application of allocation problems, namely, the Italian research assessment program known as VQR (Verifica della Qualità della Ricerca, or Research Quality Assessment)1. For the large university considered in the experiments, the problem involves thousands of agents and goods (here, researchers and their research products). The algorithms described in the paper are able to compute the Shapley value for most of those agents, and to get a good approximation of the Shapley value for all of the

Tree Projections and Structural Decomposition Methods: The Power of Local Consistency and Larger Islands of Tractability

Evaluating conjunctive queries and solving constraint satisfaction problems are fundamental problems in database theory and artificial intelligence, respectively. These problems are NP-hard, so that several research efforts have been made in the literature for identifying tractable classes, known as islands of tractability, as well as for devising clever heuristics for solving efficiently real-world instances. Many heuristic approaches are based on enforcing on the given instance a property called local consistency, where (in database terms) each tuple in every query atom matches at least one tuple in every other query atom. Interestingly, it turns out that, for many well-known classes of queries, such as for the acyclic queries, enforcing local consistency is even sufficient to solve the given instance correctly. However, the precise power of such a procedure was unclear, but for some very restricted cases. The paper provides full answers to the long-standing questions about the precise power of algorithms based on enforcing local consistency. The classes of instances where enforcing local consistency turns out to be a correct query-answering procedure are however not efficiently recognizable. In fact, the paper finally focuses on certain subclasses defined in terms of the novel notion of greedy tree projections. These latter classes are shown to be efficiently recognizable and strictly larger than most islands of tractability known so far, both in the general case of tree projections and for specific structural decomposition methods

On the Shapley value and its application to the Italian VQR research assessment exercise

Research assessment exercises have now become common evaluation tools in a number of countries. These exercises have the goal of guiding merit-based public funds allocation, stimulating improvement of research productivity through competition and assessing the impact of adopted research support policies. One case in point is Italy's most recent research assessment effort, VQR 2011–2014 (Research Quality Evaluation), which, in addition to research institutions, also evaluated university departments, and individuals in some cases (i.e., recently hired research staff and members of PhD committees). However, the way an institution's score was divided, according to VQR rules, between its constituent departments or its staff members does not enjoy many desirable properties well known from coalitional game theory (e.g., budget balance, fairness, marginality). We propose, instead, an alternative score division rule that is based on the notion of Shapley value, a well known solution concept in coalitional game theory, which enjoys the desirable properties mentioned above. For a significant test case (namely, Sapienza University of Rome, the largest university in Italy), we present a detailed comparison of the scores obtained, for substructures and individuals, by applying the official VQR rules, with those resulting from Shapley value computations. We show that there are significant differences in the resulting scores, making room for improvements in the allocation rules used in research assessment exercises